Problem
Transaction-risk tools and account-security tools often inspect separate streams. A suspicious transfer can therefore miss the login context that makes an account-takeover pattern visible.
Local fraud and security workspace
Polyglot backend engineering, applied AI orchestration, security controls, event-driven integration and honest deployment boundaries.

The problem, the decisions I owned and the boundary of my contribution.
Transaction-risk tools and account-security tools often inspect separate streams. A suspicious transfer can therefore miss the login context that makes an account-takeover pattern visible.
I designed and built the four-service architecture, shared event contracts, public showcase, deterministic replay path, integration workflow and cross-language CI around a synthetic-data-only boundary.
How the parts fit together and the decisions behind them.
Test coverage, deployment setup and current limits.
The public Vercel showcase is a smaller TypeScript application using synthetic events. The full Rust, Go, Python, PostgreSQL, Redis and Next.js system runs locally through Docker Compose.
Every account, identity, transaction and entity graph is synthetic. The system includes adaptive password hashing, rotating JWT refresh tokens, rate limits, anomaly detection and a tamper-evident audit mechanism.
Current constraints and the next improvements.
The public showcase does not include the full local payment policy, durable PostgreSQL history or Go/Redis security-event fusion. The recommended local mode uses scripted model replay. Paid inference was not exercised in the recorded verification.